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A country’s economic and social development depends on reliable, sustainable access to 
energy—at a reasonable cost.  Energy security has become a growing preoccupation for all 
countries, especially those that rely on imports.  In addition, no country wants to rely on single 
sourcing for their oil or gas, meaning that the diversification of supplies is also important.  
Today, both the US and the EU are paying much closer attention to their energy security.   
For the US, which uses over 19 million barrels per day of oil and imports over half of it, its 
energy security is tied to the stability of Saudi Arabia which is the only country with significant 
excess oil production capacity that can stabilize the oil markets and ensure that markets, 
including the US, are adequately supplied.  The current turbulence in North Africa and the Arab 
world has reinforced the importance of Saudi supplies.  It has also led to higher world oil prices 
and higher US gasoline prices, which the US government watches closely since transport fuels 
are a major part of our oil use and can impact US domestic politics.  The US government was 
particularly attentive to developments at the last OPEC meeting and weighed in with Saudi 
Arabia about raising production.  Oil remains the priority concern for America’s energy security. 
Because of the large volumes of shale gas resources that have been discovered in the US, natural 
gas is no longer at the top of our security agenda.  Shale gas has catapulted the US ahead of 
Russia to become the world’s foremost natural gas producer.  No longer needing to rely on 
imports of natural gas, the US has freed up Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) that would have been 
shipped to our markets for Europe and Asia.  It is also looking in the next years to become an 
LNG exporter.   
For Europe, in contrast to the US, energy security questions revolve mostly around natural gas 
and more specifically, around Russian pipeline gas.  The EU-27, which includes Turkey, relies 
on 3 countries for about 50% of its gas supplies: Russia, Norway, and Algeria.  Of this, Russia 
supplies 25% by pipeline.  The dependence on one company, Russia’s Gazprom, is growing.   
Since March 2011, several events impacted European gas markets and increased dependence on 
Russia.  First, the Japanese nuclear accident took out nearly a quarter of that country’s nuclear 
capacity and increased Japan’s reliance on LNG.  By July, 38 of Japan’s 54 reactors were shut 
down for inspections or some permanently because of damage due to the earthquake and 
tsunami.  Some LNG supplies that would normally go to Europe have been diverted to Japan, 
which has led a number of European countries to increase their reliance on Russian pipeline gas.  
At the same time, Italy lost 8 bcm/y of supplies through the Greenstream pipeline from Libya 
due to political upheaval and the war.  This has led Italy to increase its purchases from Russia.  
Russian company Gazprom has been the major beneficiary of these unforeseen developments.   
Next, Germany announced that it would shutter all of its nuclear plants by 2022 and Italy voted 
not to restart its nuclear program after witnessing the Japanese experience.  What this means is 
that Europe’s reliance on Russian gas will continue to grow.  This is positive news for Gazprom 
but it also means that the EU-27 will focus intensively on finding other suppliers, in addition to 
Russia.  This is because the EU’s energy security goals stress the need for gas supply 
diversification. 
Since Russia and China have so far failed to settle on a gas pricing agreement that would start 
substantial flows of Russian gas to China by 2015 or 2016, Europe will continue to be central for 
Gazprom’s export plans.  The first pipeline to China that has been discussed would run from 
fields in western Siberia that could also supply Europe.  The idea for Russia is to be able to 
swing its supplies between Europe and China.  The strategy has so far been undermined by 
Chinese unwillingness to meet Russian price demands, which are based on European gas prices 
indexed to the price of oil.  Had the Chinese gas deal been signed in June, Moscow could have 
sent a strong signal to Europe that it has options.  Instead, Russia is now redoubling its efforts to 
ship more pipeline gas to Europe. 
For the foreseeable future, Russia will make its “gas” money in Europe, with Germany 
remaining one of its key customers.  The Russian relationship with German companies 
BASF/Wintershall and E.ON Ruhrgas will continue to deepen, while after the announced nuclear 
shutdown, a new partnership is forming between Gazprom and German company RWE.  In order 
to fuel its existing and new power plants, RWE is now in discussions to rely increasingly on 
Russian gas at advantageous prices.  Coincidentally, RWE is a key investor in a rival project to 
Russian supplies, the Nabucco gas pipeline that would ship Caspian gas to Europe, promoting 
the diversification of European gas supplies.  A partnership with Gazprom would likely remove 
RWE from projects like Nabucco that compete with Gazprom’s plans for Europe.  While 
Nabucco has yet to get off the ground, at the end of 2011, the Nord Stream pipeline that connects 
Russian gas supplies directly to Germany, bypassing the Baltic Republics, Poland and Central 
Europe, will start up, providing Russia with a direct gas link into the German market and from 
there into other markets in northwest Europe.  German companies BASF/Wintershall and E.ON 
Ruhrgas are investors in the Nord Stream project.  Current Russian supplies reach Europe 
through transit countries, Ukraine and Belarus.  Nord Stream will also bypass them. 
Nord Stream is happening at the same time that US companies are becoming increasingly 
involved in Central European shale gas developments in Poland, Bulgaria and Romania.  The US 
company presence in these countries focuses US government attention in a part of Europe that 
has traditionally been a Gazprom stronghold.  There is growing collaboration between the US 
and Central Europe on shale gas development.  When President Obama recently visited Poland, 
he addressed questions related to energy security, well aware of course that US companies were 
involved in potentially game-changing activities in that country.  The Nord Stream pipeline and 
eventually if shale gas is realized in Poland -- these represent a form of northern corridor 
European supplies, with one being Russian gas and the other indigenous Polish production that 
could create new supply options for other Central European countries, as well as the three Baltic 
countries. 
Then there is the question of the southern corridor for non-Russian gas shipments from the 
Caspian across Turkey to Europe.  Gas delivered through the southern corridor would provide 
new supplies, furthering European energy security goals.  This past May, Turkmenistan held its 
annual gas conference in the Caspian resort city of Avaza.  The US State Department’s Senior 
Advisor Dan Stein addressed the event, and discussed US support for the southern corridor.  He 
emphasized US shared interests with Europe, which have led to Washington’s involvement in 
questions related to European energy security.  This includes US backing for Caspian gas flows 
across Turkey to Europe. 
In October 2011, Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR and its international oil company 
partners in the offshore Shah Deniz field are expected to decide on a pipeline option to transport 
southern corridor gas to Turkey and then onward to European markets starting in 2017.   Unless 
the decision is delayed, an agreement for the route of a southern corridor pipeline to Europe is 
expected to unlock many possibilities for European energy security during this decade, adding 
new Caspian supply sources into the continent’s energy mix.   
The US and EU have encouraged Turkmenistan to cooperate with Azerbaijan and sign an 
Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) to build a TransCaspian Gas Pipeline (TGP) that could 
become a part of the new infrastructure envisioned for the southern corridor.  The signing of an 
IGA would eliminate some of the geopolitical insecurity.  It could spur private company interest 
in the TGP and be a catalyst for its financing.  The US was involved in a similar effort in the late 
1990s and this is a case of history repeating itself, except that now Europe is in greater need of 
accessing new gas supplies and from as many sources as possible, with Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan seen as logical suppliers. 
In summary, given recent developments with a growing need for LNG in Asia (creating 
competition for LNG supplies between Europe and Asia), the seeming end of the nuclear option 
for Italy and Germany, coupled with declining domestic gas production in Europe itself and the 
benefits of gas for meeting the goals of reduced carbon emissions, the southern corridor and 
shale gas could offer Europe much needed alternatives on top of the growing supplies Europe 
will receive from Russia.  Both alternative options have yet to be realized.  While the US and EU 
are cooperating with a political push to realize some form of a southern corridor pipeline, the US 
and Central Europe are cooperating on shale gas by trying to transfer lessons learned in the US. 
 
